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The Sounds of Silence: Can Post-Miranda Silence Be Used to
Rebut an Insanity Defense?





To be argued November 13, 1985
ISSUE
Almost a decade ago, the Supreme Court held, in
Doyle v. Ohio (426 U.S. 610 (1976)), that a criminal de-
fendant's silence in response to receiving post-arrest,
post-Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)] warnings
could not be inquired into by the prosecution on cross-
examination, because such silence was "insoluably am-
biguous." Now, the Florida Attorney General is asking
the Court to carve out an exception to the Doyle doctrine
and rule that a defendant's post-Miranda warnings si-
lence is admissible, as state of mind evidence, to rebut a
defendant's insanity plea.
In recent terms, the Supreme Court has appeared
almost eager to create new limitations to Miranda's doc-
trine that a criminal defendant must be warned that he
or she has the right to remain silent as well as the right to
assistance of counsel prior to interrogation. Following its
initial "cut-back" decision of,'larris v. New York (401 U.S.
222 (1971), which held Miranda does not bar the prose-
cution's use of defendant's responses for impeachment
purposes), the Court has sanctioned using what would
otherwise be characterized as "tainted" evidence: 1) to
locate witnesses identified in the statement (Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974)); 2) in questioning witnesses
during grand jury proceedings (United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338 (1974)), and 3) where the public safety
would otherwise be imperiled (New York v. Quarles, 104
S. Ct. 2626 (1984)). The Court's disposition of the cur-
rent case may well augur the degree to which it will
countenance further Miranda inroads.
A second issue in the case arises from trial counsel's
failure to object to introducing testimony as to de-
fendant's silence: the Court will consider whether this
failure constitutes a "procedural default" barring subse-
quent review under Wainwright v. Sykes (433 U.S. 72
(1977)).
Michael L. Perlin is an Associate Professor of Law and Direc-
tor of the Litigation Clinic at New York Law School, 57 Worth
Street, New York, NY 10013; telephone (212) 431-2183.
FACTS
In June of 1975, David Wayne Greenfield was walk-
ing on a wooded path toward a beach area when he
grabbed a passerby, choked her, dragged her into the
woods and forced her to have oral sex. Subsequently, he
made several inconsistent statements to the victim, in-
cluding, "I don't know why I did this/I know why I did
this." After smoking one of the victim's cigarettes, he
found her car keys (which had apparently been lost
during the assault) and released her.
The victim went immediately to police headquarters
and described her assailant; approximately two hours
later, an officer came to the beach area, located Green-
field and arrested him. After being given his Miranda
warnings, Greenfield indicated that he wished to speak
to a lawyer and further thanked the policeman for giv-
ing him the warnings.
Greenfield was charged in Florida state court with
the crime of "sexual battery committed with force likely
to cause serious personal injury," and pled not guilty by
reason of insanity. As part of the state's case, it intro-
duced police testimony indicating the defendant's si-
lence and request for a lawyer when he was given his
Miranda warnings. Greenfield made no objection to the
testimony.
Greenfield did not take the stand, but did call two
psychiatrists, both of whom testified that defendant
demonstrated "classic symptoms of paranoid schizoph-
renia," and that he did not know right from wrong (the
insanity test in Florida) during the alleged crime. On
rebuttal, the state called a psychiatrist who disagreed
sharply with each of the defense psychiatrists' conclu-
sions. In his summation and over defense counsel's ob-
jections, the prosecutor focused sharply on Greenfield's
behavior after apprehension:
This is supposedly an insane person under the [throes] of
an acute condition of schizophrenia paranoia at the time.
He goes to the car and the officer reads him his [Miranda]
rights. Does he say he doesn't understand them? Does he
say, "What's going on?" No. He says, "I upderstand my
rights. I do not want to speak to you. I want to speak to an
attorney." Again an occasion of a person who knows what's
going on around his surroundings, and knows the conse-
quences of his acts. ... And after [defendant] talked to the
attorney again he will not speak. Again another physical
overt indication by the defendant .... So here again we must
take this in consideration as to his guilt or innocence, in
regards to sanity or insanity.
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Thejury found Greenfield guilty and sentenced him to
life imprisonment.
After his motion for a new trial or acquittal (because
of the prosecutor's comments on his post-arrest silence)
was denied, Greenfield appealed to the state courts
which affirmed his conviction (337 So. 2d 1021 (1976)
and 364 So. 2d 885 (1978)). He then filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. After
hearing evidence regarding whether Wainwright v. Sykes
(which precludes habeas consideration of claims not
raised at trial or on direct appeal in accordance with
state trial procedures) barred consideration of his claim,
the magistrate recommended that the issue not be con-
sidered barred because the state appellate court did
reach the merits. However, it recommended dismissal
on the merits.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed (741 F. 2d
329 (1984)), holding that: 1) Greenfield's failure to con-
temporaneously object to the key testimony did not pre-
clude his right to seek appellate review (in light of his
strenuous objections to the prosecutor's summation on
that point), and 2) evidence of his post-Miranda silence
here was inadmissible as substantive evidence to rebut
Greenfield's insanity defense. Relying primarily on Doyle
v. Ohio, the court found, first, that defendant's silence
was not probative of sanity. The court stressed the diffi-
culties inherent in interpreting the silence of a mentally
disabled person: "The probative value of a person's
post-arrest, post-Miranda warning silence in determin-
ing his sanity at the time of the crime will vary markedly
with the disease he has, the symptoms he bends to ex-
hibit, and the closeness in time between the arrest and
warning and the crime." Second, because defendant did
not testify (but, rather, raised the defense through ex-
pert testimony), the testimony as to silence was not ad-
missible as a rebuttal of perjury. According to the court,
"Petitioner's assertion of insanity, through psychiatric
testimony, made no reference to his conduct at the time
of the arrest, did not constitute perjury, and therefore
did not open the door to the prosecutor's use of post-
Miranda silence as permitted by Doyle."
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
This is an area of the law which has, up until this
point, seen surprisingly little development. Other than
the two cases distinguished by the Eleventh Circuit in
Greenfield, which had held that Doyle was inapposite in an
insanity defense context, (Sulie v. Duckworth, 689 F. 2d
128 (7th Cir. 1982) and United States v. Trujilo, 578 F. 2d
285 (10th Cir. 1978)), the issue here has simply not been
litigated in this context. As previously indicated, Green-
field gives the Supreme Court another opportunity to
limit Miranda as well as to diminish the impact of Doyle.
If it chooses to use this case as a vehicle for such a
limitation, it will be significant for two reasons.
First, in Doyle, notwithstanding the fact that de-
fendants both testified in a way (according to the three
Doyle dissenters) "graphically inconsistent" with their
silence, the Court chose to reverse the conviction be-
cause such silence was "insolubly ambiguous." Since
Greenfield did not testify, a rejection of the Doyle prin-
ciples will be a clear signal that the Court's impatience
with Miranda is growing rapidly.
Second, if the Court chooses to so limit Miranda and
Doyle in an insanity defense case, it will be forced to
tiptoe through the landmines of what, exactly, is post-
arrest behavior that comports with mental disability?
The jury in this case apparently accepted the prosecu-
tor's theory, and found that the defendant's actions were
those of "a person who ... knows the consequences of his
act." Greenfield quotes standard psychiatric textbooks to
support his contention that "irregular shifts between
lucid and confused moments are a clinical feature of
schizophrenia." In fact, he argues that "paranoid forms
of psychosis also frequently manifest themselves in the
very caution and preoccupation with real or perceived rights
which [the state] would attribute to sanity."
If the Supreme Court chooses to accept explicitly the
state's theory that evidence that Greenfield's behavior
"was not ranting, raving incoherent or obviously con-
fused or unbalanced while not conclusive proof of san-
ity, was certainly relevant," it will of necessity be forced
to articulate yet another theory on the role of the courts
in interpreting psychiatric data.
Finally, there remains the "other" procedural issue in
Greenfield: whether defense counsel's failure to object to
the police testimony as to the defendants "normal" be-
havior constitutes a "procedural default" under Sykes.
The state argues that such failure does preclude further
review (construing Florida law to bar raising such as
issue on appeal, absent a contemporaneous mistrial mo-
tion). Greenfield, on the other hand, suggests that the
issue is not properly before the Supreme Court (as the
state failed to assign the issue as error below); or that,
alternatively, counsel's objections to the prosecutor's ref-
erence to the critical testimony during summation suffi-
ciently preserved the issue.
ARGUMENTS
For Louie L. Wainwright (Counsel of Record, Ann Garrison
Paschall, 1313 Tampa Street, Suite 804, Park Trammell Build-
ing, Tampa, FL 33602; telephone (813) 272-2670)
1. Since sanity is a nebulous issue, the interests ofjustice
are best served when the trier of fact has access to all
the evidence reasonably bearing on the accused's de-
meanor near the time of the offense. Thus, using
post-Miranda warning behavior does not violate Doyle.
2. Failure to object to the police testimony at trial pre-
cludes further litigation of the issue under Sykes.
Issue No. 3 83
For David Wayne Greenfield (Court-Appointed Counsel,
James D. Whittemore, One Tampa City Center, Suite 2470,
Tampa, FL 33602; telephone (813) 224-9550)
1. Silence is ambiguous, and there is neither a constitu-
tional nor a rational basis for not applying Doyle in an
insanity case where a defendant chooses not to testify.
There is no conflict between defendant's being able to
rationally understand his Miranda rights when ar-
rested and his being not responsible during commis-
sion of the questioned act.
2. Failure to assign the Sykes issue as error bars its con-
sideration now. In the alternative, the record is suffi-
ciently preserved by defense counsel's objections to
summation.
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